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| Tags: logic , logical , objective , objectivism , philosophy , philosophy of logic , subjective , subjectivism |
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Very professional
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Last edited by Gurdur; 11-Jul-2009 at 12:21 AM (00:21). |
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Very professional
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So, starting in:
let's adopt some initial premises, some which I personally believe to be all-important:
Just why these premises are important will be discussed onwards in this thread; but we can quickly say that: (1) is important, since many have an emotional hankering for total, fixed, objective knowledge, which is impossible in the whole, since otherwise we would need a Turing Calculating Machine bigger than our universe to calculate all the knowledge needed. It is often surprising just how much knowledge is in fact an approximation; when I studied Electrical Engineering, we students had to do an experiment determing the force of gravity. The apparatus we used was very good, and very accurate, but even so we had to make a large number of runs, i.e. we had to repeat the whole experiment a large number of times, then we obtained a kind of statistical median from all the results of all the runs in order to get a really accurate value. (2) is important just as a starting point, i.e. we are not brains in bottles, and each of us actually exists. (3) This is partially related to (1); for example, when we decide if a theory or alleged fact is mere paranoia, or justified, really, the only way we can do that much of the time is social. More later. Last edited by Gurdur; 03-Jun-2009 at 07:44 AM (07:44). |
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Senior Member
Join Date: May 2009
Location: Cambridge, England
Posts: 116
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I don't think I'm quite on board with what you mean by your first premise. Are you equating "objective knowledge" with "total knowledge"? I would agree that clearly it's not practically possible for us to know every fine detail about reality; but I see no problem with saying that we can know some things objectively (if there is something to be objectively known, which seems to be one of your underlying premises), and I see no logical reason why total knowledge can't be known. For another thing, why is the premise even necessary? And isn't the premise itself an objective statement about the whole of reality?
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Senior Member
Join Date: Mar 2009
Posts: 141
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Quote:
The word "knowledge" has undergone quite a few changes in its history. You, yourself make a distinction between "objective" and (what did you use?) "total" knowledge. In recent philosophy, what was once a word referring to objective certainty is now inter-subjective provisional understanding (along with a host of intermediaries, of course). The difficulty with modern epistemology is that it assumes the modern understanding is the one everyone holds, which (I don't think it is too much of a stretch to say) is not necessarily the case. As far as Gurdur equating (did you mean equivocating?) "objective" knowledge with "total" knowledge, it is really a matter of asking you what term you would like to use to depict certainty. When he uses the word "objective," plug in your favourite term-du-jour. People desperately want to use the word knowledge, primarily because of its persuasive force, and its association with it being objectively (totally?) the case, independent of our individual or collective perceptions. Now it is generally accepted that for there to be knowledge, there must be two things, the knower and the known, and this has implications. Beyond that, the traditional definition of knowledge was justified-true-belief - that is to say believer (the knower), truth (the thing known) and some legitimate connection between the two. This sets the stage for the primary historical conflict in epistemology. Questions like what constitutes justification, what the relationship between the knower and the known actually is and the requirements for claims to "knowledge" are. Is knowledge something we have (does it exists without a knower or even without the known); is the distinction between noumena and phenomena a function of reality or an implication of our knowledge states. perhaps knowledge is a function of the relationship. In any event, the word true is where things get ugly, since it has quite a bit of important content that is easily glossed over. Assumed in the traditional definition of knowledge is the possibility of determining truth. Now unless one wants to water down the word truth, there is still quite a strong claim being made - one which in my view, and I suspect Gurdur's view) is indefensible. I cannot speak for Gurdur, but for my own part, I no longer see things in terms of knowledge ("objective" as Gurdur phrases it, "total" as you phrase it). This is not entirely true; I am a realist. I posit, as Gurdur does, that there is a reality out there. I just think we cannot have direct perceptual access to it such that we can make claims like "knowledge" or "truth" with certainty. This doesn't prohibit provisional claims, perhaps with probablistic understanding and with varying degrees of corresponding "confidence." Claims beyond thios are much too strong for what we have, and our perceptions are fallible, both those of our physical sense and those of our intuitions. The last few hundred years have shown us the power of "seeking truth, but never assuming we have it." Please allow me to disabuse anyone of the idea that logic is a truth assessment method. There is a significant difference between an in-system truth-value and an extra system truth. Logic is merely a system of wff (well-formed formulae) designed to lead us from truth-value X (which is not the same thing as truth) to truth value X in a sequence of propositions. It is an attempt to turn natural language into a kind of mathematics - hence the name "propositional calculus." Whether a proposition is a premise or a conclusion depends on where in the sequence of steps we look, with one exception - the axioms. Axioms are posited as assumptions before calculations. While the standard Funk&Wagnall's describes an axiom as having its truth assumed, this is really a mistaken understanding. Instead, think of an axiom as having its truth-value (for purposes of propositional calculus) assumed, which, again, is not the same thing as truth at all. Why is this interesting? Because, with the "proper" axioms, one can prove the "truth-value" of almost anything. Also, one can posit axioms (assigning them truth values) without assuming they are true in any "objective" or "total" sense. The actual truth of a proposition is something that is set outside the system. It is easy to become infatuated with logical systems, especially if they are particularly elegant or impressively complex, but the basic case is that logic does not determine truth at all. Think of every logical "argument" as a conditional, even when it is not expressed that way. This why we have a distinction between a "valid" argument and a "sound" argument. A valid argument is one in which the wffs are followed properly. A sound argument is one in which the wffs are followed and that also has the benefit of actually representing reality. Now there is a way of saying that one can have knowledge through logic alone. This is in the sense of the interelations between definitions, but these are generally held to be trivial, since one can ask with perfect legitimacy whether a definition bears some relationship to reality. Knowledge in the non-trivial sense is independent of logic. So, in all cases, we are left with some external referent (external to the logical system) being the abjudicator of the "trueness" of the axioms, which again, is separate and distinct from the truth-values of the axioms. With the advent of empiricism, we shifted from moving from axioms to conclusions to moving backwards from conclusions (not as conclusions, but as observations) and trying to figure out what the axioms were. Does this method reasoning sound vaguely familar to anyone...?
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Very professional
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dglas made a rather brilliant reply to this, but here's my own partial reply, much more to come later.
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Because of Pontius Pilate. Pontius Pilate (allegedly): "But what is truth?" We can't avoid questions about what is true when we discuss logic; that leads perforce to discussing what is truth. Dglas has already made some great remarks about this whole area, the interface between logic and truth, but there's a great deal yet left to explore. Quote:
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Now that calls for yet another thread for me to kick off, and I will do so soon.Many thanks for engaging in this discussion! It's really helpful as you and dglas have done to make all objections very clear as quickly as possible, since then we can keep this discussion on the things that really interest you all as well as me. ________ * As a mathematician, you will be aware that there are certain problems in mathematics which cannot be solved, and which are known to be insoluble? And that there are certain problems in mathematics which exist in limbo, since it is not yet known whether they can be solved in principle or not yet? "There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know." --- Donald Rumsfeld "Not even Rumsfeld can get it totally wrong all the time" --- Gurdur |
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Senior Member
Join Date: May 2009
Location: Cambridge, England
Posts: 116
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I seem to be missing something here; I don't see where objectivity of knowledge comes into the objectivity of logic itself - as dglas says logic has no bearing on whether a particular proposition accurately reflects reality or not. Or are you not talking about logic itself?
Could you possibly roughly outline the argument so I could see the bigger picture? The language is so sticky in this area, and a bit more context might be helpful in clarifying things. |
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Very professional
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Quote:
Logic is a collection of systems dealing with inter-relationships. It is used in life as a method for clarifying knowledge; all the knowledge is there in the premises, but it is not clarified till we make it clear using logical methods. As such, when dealing with the natural world, then the objectivity, or impartiality if you will, of logic can be a very pressing issue. B.H. has on the Hub mooted that logic may be subjective; it's part of my goal here to show that that is not the case, that logic is indeed "objective" --- meaning impartial, and wholly independent of human perception and interpretation. It exists in the natural world in its own right, independent of humans. And thusly, while taking dglas' comments into account, the matter of truth propositions, truth itself, and what is true (a bit seperate from "truth"), will all come into play. More much later, my absolute apologies, but right at the moment I am coding, coding, coding. |
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