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The tautologist
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I feel like another discussion on epistemology is in order!
![]() Us humans have an impulse to seek knowledge at ever "higher" levels, defined by ever more general categories of things. We constantly try to move from the more particular towards increasingly more general. This is true of sciences and of philosophies. Once we have started on this search for higher and higher categories, there are three possible alternatives where such a search may end up: 1. The world may not be systematically organized, or we may not be able to know it, above a certain level of generalization, which might even be relatively low in the hierarchy of categories. In other words, there may be a limit to the systematicity of the world or to its intelligibility. 2. The hierarchy of categories may go on indefinitely, with no level at which an all-inclusive category exists. In this case, the world might be systematic, but not completely intelligible. The process of gaining knowledge of the world would be an infinite, and hence uncompleteable, task. 3. The iteration up the hierarchy of categories and essences might terminate with an all-inclusive category, whose essence would explain the nature of all things. Only in his case would the world be totally intelligible, at least in principle. Which of these alternatives should one accept, and for what reasons? The endlessly optimistic scientists and philosophers tend to presuppose no. 3 in their daily work. Why? Scientists should be skeptical and wary, yet they tend to choose the least skeptical, most hopeful and idealized alternative. Right now, I see no reason to. I'm personally inclined towards the second alternative, myself. But this question is not really a question about sciences or philosophies per se, but about the metaphysical assumptions underlying any search for knowledge. In metaphysics, there is already an all-inclusive category to which everything in existence can be reduced: it is 'being'. The main difference between 2 and 3 is that 2 rejects 'being' as a meaningful category. 3 brings with itself a metaphysical assumption that there is an all-inclusive category of 'being', or existence itself. And since there is also a common metaphysical theory of essences (all things have a collection of properties that makes it the kind of thing it is), it follows that this 'being' must have an essence, so there is an Essence of Being - what the "world out there" is really like. (2) rejects this, and this I see as the main boon of this approach.
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I'm not just blonde, I'm perfect, too. Last edited by Gurdur; 11-Jul-2009 at 12:24 AM (00:24). |
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Dr Jekyll and Mr Jackass
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Sheffield
Posts: 240
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I would tend towards 2) as well. I'm not even sure 3) is desireable. One form of knowledge endlessly reaching its tendrils into every aspect of my life, physical, mental and emotional? If I wanted that, theism would appeal to me.
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"...I realised that the purpose of writing is to inflate weak ideas, obscure poor reasoning and inhibit clarity." - Calvin (the funny one, not the one who did all that predestination crap) |
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independent thief
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: western Colorado
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Senior Member
Join Date: Feb 2008
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The tautologist
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Well, yes, what kennethamy said. The idea is that each more general category is supposed to have increasingly higher explanatory power. It's not for nothing that Heidegger and other fans of being-as-such wasted so much effort at making sense of it. The belief was (and still is, I suppose) that to analyse the category "being" would reveal something that underlies and is part of everything that exists.
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Member
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Finland
Posts: 69
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I don't think that pure bottom-up categorization processes really exist. The three alternatives reflect the said opinion. Alternatives 1 and 2 say that bottom-up process is either impossible or infinite. Alternative 3 de facto defines top-down process by defining "terminal category" on top.
Instead of choosing one of the alternatives, I'd combine 2 and 3, seeing that the iteration process alternates between top-down (3) and bottom-up (2)processes. Occasionally they meet each other showing contradictions: a Kuhnian paradigmatic revolution happens, the contradictory categories are demolished and the iteration restarts from earlier levels. |
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Dr Jekyll and Mr Jackass
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Sheffield
Posts: 240
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What of history, then? How does one even conceive of a totalistic theory of human history itself, let alone implant that into a 'top down' process?
I'm also curious as to what people understand by 'the nature of all things'? Does it require knowledge of what has happened in the past and what will happen in the future, or simply what is happening now? Also, does any knowledge regarding the inevitable uncertainty of certain things (eg atomic decay) represent imperfect knowledge about those things. Will we truly be satisfied with 'knowing what we cannot know'. I'm not disagreeing with anyone, just throwing out some thoughts. I'm considering doing a research project next year on something around this. |
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Member
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Finland
Posts: 69
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The theory of evolution is a theory of long historical process, including the whole evolution of humans. In that sense it can be called "totalistic". It has a top-down form, because it assumes that the basic rules (random mutation and natural selection) works throughout the whole process, though all phases are not even known.
IMO the common singular property of all things is their existence. If we name "reality" the realm of all existing things we can infer that all things have some relation to each other, and together they form a coherent reality. Historical view is no constraint: things appear, change and disappear - not disturbing the coherence of reality. So that's my suggestion for the nature of all things: they are members of a coherent reality.
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